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PRIVILEGED OR NOT? HOW THE CURRENT
APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT




On February 19, 2004, in the course of investigating possible criminal
violations by Connecticut state employees, "a federal grand jury
subpoenaed the testimony of Anne C. George, former chief legal counsel to
the Office of the Governor of Connecticut."' Prior to seeking the subpoena
for George's testimony, the U.S. Attorney's Office in New Haven had been
investigating whether Governor John Rowland and his staff accepted gifts
in return for public favors, such as awarding government contracts.2 The
Government requested that George submit to a voluntary interview. 3
George declined after the Governor's Office informed her that it believed
the information sought by the investigators was protected by the attorney-
client privilege because the communications were in confidence and
conducted for the purpose of providing legal advice.4 In her appearance
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Bruce A. Green for his guidance. Eternal gratitude to my family, especially my parents, Paul
D. Blumenauer and Rosemary Blumenauer, for their continuous love and support. Thank
you Ryan F. Kenny for always making me smile. Your love and patience are endless. I
would also like to thank my friends for their constant encouragement and willingness to edit,
especially Amy Mikolajczyk.
1. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005). Anne C. George
served in that capacity from August 2000 to December 2002. Id. Beforehand, she served as
deputy legal counsel. Id.
2. Id. at 528-29. The Government sought to gain access to certain specified
communications between Governor John Rowland, his staff, and legal counsel. Id. at 529.
"The identity of former Governor Rowland was initially protected by the 'John Doe'
appellation and by various orders sealing the district court proceedings and those in this
court." Id. at 528-29 n.1. After Rowland pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
commit honest services mail fraud and tax fraud on December 23, 2004, the court revoked
the sealing orders because there was no purpose served in adhering to them. Id.
3. Id. at 529.
4. Id. at 529-30. The attorney-client privilege is a common law evidence rule. It
applies to communications between a lawyer and her client regarding legal advice, but only
when the client communicates with her lawyer for the purpose of securing legal advice, legal
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before the grand jury in April 2004, George confirmed that she had
discussions with the Governor and his staff about Connecticut's ethics laws
pertaining to the receipt of gifts. 5 George also testified that she had spoken
with Rowland's former co-Chief of Staff about a practice of state contracts
being sent to the Governor's Office for approval; 6 however, she refused to
divulge the content of these conversations. 7 Later that month, a federal
district court entered an order compelling George's testimony. 8 Judge
Robert Chatigny reasoned that "'in the grand jury context, any
governmental attorney-client privilege must yield because the interests
served by the grand jury's fact-finding process clearly outweigh the interest
served by the privilege.' 9
Before George could respond to the district court's order, a shake-up at
the Governor's mansion intervened. Governor Rowland pleaded guilty to
one count of conspiracy to commit honest services mail fraud and tax fraud
and announced that he would resign as Connecticut's Governor, effective
July 1, 2004.10 The federal government requested that Rowland's
successor, Governor M. Jodi Rell, waive the attorney-client privilege
between George and the Governor's Office. I I Shortly thereafter, the newly
appointed counsel to the Office of the Governor informed the court that
Governor Rell declined to waive the attorney-client privilege.12 On August
25, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an order
services, or assistance in some legal proceeding. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying
text (providing definitions of the attomey-client privilege); see also Model Rules of Prof 1
Conduct R. 1.6 (1983) (discussing confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of a client); Model Code of Prof I Responsibility Canon 4 (1983) (discussing
the preservation of a client's confidences).
5. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 529. Prior to George's appearance
before the grand jury, the government moved to compel George to testify about the contents
of her confidential communications with Governor Rowland and members of his staff, but
the district court withheld decision until George's actual appearance and assertion of the
privilege before the grand jury. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 529-30. George asserted the attorney-client privilege on behalf of her client
because she testified that all of these conversations were in confidence and conducted for the
purpose of providing legal advice. Id.; see infra Part L.A (discussing the definition and
purpose of the attorney-client privilege).
8. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 530.
9. Id. (quoting District Court Judge Robert Chatigny). Summarizing the lower court
decision, the Second Circuit stated,
The district court distinguished the "governmental" attorney-client privilege from
the privilege in the context of a private attorney-client relationship, by explaining
that "unlike a private lawyer's duty of loyalty to an individual client, a government
lawyer's duty does not lie solely with his or her client agency," but also with the
public.
Id. (quoting District Court Judge Robert Chatigny).
10. Id. at 528 n.1, 530.
11. Id. at 530. This request was made because the privilege is not held by the Governor
as an individual but by the Office of the Governor. Id. For a detailed discussion of the entity
privilege, see infra Part I.B.
12. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 530.
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reversing the district court decision compelling George to testify). 3 The
court stated that while "it is in the public interest for the grand jury to
collect all the relevant evidence it can[,] ... it is also in the public interest
for high state officials to receive and act upon the best possible legal
advice."'14 The Second Circuit noted that its decision is in "conflict" with
the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re A Witness Before the Special Grand
Jury,15 "and is in sharp tension" 16 with the decisions of the Eighth Circuit
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 17 and the D.C. Circuit in In re
Lindsey. 8
The Second Circuit's recognition of a government attorney-client
privilege in a criminal investigative proceeding has led some commentators
to believe that the Second Circuit is now at odds with three other federal
appeals courts. This Note argues that although the Second Circuit reached a
different conclusion, its decision is not necessarily in conflict with the
Eighth, D.C., and Seventh Circuits. 19  In analyzing the government
attorney-client privilege, circuit courts have framed the issue in terms of
balancing the public interest: Is the public interest better served by
recognizing the privilege, thereby encouraging open communication
between government officials and their attorneys, or is this interest
overcome by the grand jury's need to access relevant information to
adequately serve its truth-seeking function? 20 The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that if the intended purpose of the privilege is to be served, the
participants in the confidential conversation "must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.
An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all."'21 This Note argues that the courts are improperly analyzing whether
the government attorney-client privilege should be recognized in the
context of grand jury proceedings. Currently, courts control the privilege
and decide whether to apply the privilege based on their determination of
whether asserting or waiving the privilege will better serve the public
13. Id.
14. Id. at 534; see infra Part II.C (providing a detailed explanation of the court's
rationale).
15. 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). For a more in-depth discussion of the case, see infra
Part II.A.3.
16. Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 536 n.4.
17. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). For a detailed case discussion, see infra Part II.A.1.
18. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). For a more detailed case discussion, see infra Part
II.A.2. The Second Circuit acknowledged in a footnote that its decision "conflicted" with
the other circuits, stating, "We are mindful that uniformity among the circuits fosters
predictability in the invocation of the privilege and suppresses forum shopping.... We are
in no position however, to resolve this tension." Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 536
n.4 (citations omitted).
19. See infra Part III (proposing a resolution for the said conflict).
20. See infra note 121 (providing examples of the courts' analyses).
21. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). For a detailed case
discussion, see infra Part I.B.
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interest. This Note argues that instead, control of the privilege should shift
to the government entity asserting it. This shift could be successfully
achieved by aligning the power to assert or waive the privilege with other
litigating authority that exists within the entity. Allowing the government
entity to control the privilege would not lead to a derogation of the public
interest because government entities have public obligations. Therefore,
when determining whether to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege,
the government entity must consider the relevant public interests. This shift
would align the government privilege with that of other organizational
entities. Additionally, this analytical framework would effectively eliminate
the circuit split.Part I of this Note provides the history and purpose of the attorney-client
privilege, which will serve as a framework for understanding the ambiguity
surrounding the government attomey-client privilege. The nature and scope
of the attorney-client privilege will be analyzed for both individual and
entity clients. Part I also describes the development and current state of the
government attorney-client privilege in the context of a civil proceeding.
Part II of the Note examines the circuit cases that have addressed whether
to recognize the government attorney-client privilege in criminal
investigative proceedings. The rationales of the circuits rejecting the
government privilege are discussed, as well as the Second Circuit's
reasoning in upholding the privilege. In addition to presenting the courts'
rationales, this part summarizes commentary on both sides of the issue.
Part III of the Note critiques the current test used by the courts in
determining whether to recognize the government attorney-client privilege.
This part proposes that control of the privilege should shift to the
government entity, thus aligning the government privilege with that of other
organizational entities. Finally, this part discusses the benefits of such a
change.
I. BACKGROUND
This part provides background information for understanding the
attorney-client privilege generally and the way its application varies in
different contexts. Part L.A analyzes the nature and scope of the private
attorney-client privilege. Part I.B discusses the privilege in the entity
context, particularly focusing on the corporate privilege. Part I.C describes
the origins of the government attorney-client privilege. Finally, Part I.D
describes the current state of the government attorney-client privilege in the
civil context and contrasts it with the government attorney-client privilege
in the criminal investigative context.
[Vol. 75
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A. History and Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege
"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law."' 22 In 1889, the
Supreme Court in Hunt v. Blackburn23 stated that the privilege "is founded
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of
persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure. '24  In his treatise on
evidence, John Henry Wigmore defined the attorney-client privilege by
separating it into eight elements:
(1) [w]here legal advice is sought, (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived. 25
The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers26 provides another
definition which states that the privilege protects: (1) a communication;27
(2) made between privileged persons; 28 (3) in confidence; 29 (4) for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client. 30
The privilege is designed to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients, enabling an attorney to properly
represent the client by making it more likely that the client will disclose all
relevant facts.3 1 Another persuasive justification for the privilege is that it
"promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice" by recognizing that sound legal advice "depends
upon the lawyer[] being fully informed by the client."' 32 It is the lawyer's
22. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (citing 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed., 4th ed. 1961)).
23. 131 U.S. 403 (1889).
24. Id. at 470.
25. 8 Wigmore, supra note 22, at 542.
26. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000).
27. Id. § 69 (defining communication as "any expression through which a privileged
person... undertakes to convey information to another privileged person and any document
or other record revealing such an expression").
28. Id. § 70 (defining a privileged person as "the client (including a prospective client),
the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between them, and agent
of the lawyer who facilitate the representation").
29. Id. § 71 (stating that any communication is in confidence if "at the time and in the
circumstances of the communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that no
one will learn the contents of the communication except a privileged person").
30. Id. § 72 (including any communication made to, or to assist, a person "(1) who is a
lawyer or who the client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a lawyer; and (2)
whom the client or prospective client consults for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance").
31. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
32. Id.; see also Model Code of Prof I Responsibility EC 4-1 (1980) ("A lawyer should
be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain
the full advantage of our legal system.").
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responsibility to exercise his professional judgment to separate the "relevant
and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance ... of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of
the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance." 33
B. Entity Privilege
The government attorney-client privilege is an organizational privilege.
Therefore, it is often analogized to other organizational entities, including
the corporation.34 The elements of the entity privilege are the same as the
individual attorney-client privilege except that the entity is considered the
client of the attorney.35 Thus, individuals within the entity do not hold the
privilege personally. The entity, acting through its agents, determines
whether to assert or waive the privilege. 36 While the justifications for
extending the privilege in the entity context are the same as in the private
setting, questions regarding the privilege's scope frequently arise because,
unlike the individual client, it is not always the case that the information
provider is the person acting on the lawyer's advice.37 Oftentimes, when
the client is an entity, various agents or officers within the entity supply the
information that counsel needs to advise effectively. 38
For example, in Upjohn Co. v. United States, independent accountants
conducting an audit of one of Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries discovered that
the subsidiary made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government
officials in order to secure government business. 39 In deciding to conduct
an internal investigation, Upjohn's attorneys prepared a questionnaire that
was sent to "All Foreign General and Area Managers" stating that the
Chairman was seeking detailed information concerning payments made by
Upjohn or any of its subsidiaries to any employee or official of a foreign
33. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (quoting the Model Code of Prof 1 Responsibility EC 4-1).
34. See Todd A. Ellinwood, "In the Light of Reason and Experience ": The Case for a
Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 1291, 1303 (advocating the
need for a strong attorney client privilege similar to the privilege of other entity
organizations); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 474 (1998) (applying the principles of the corporate
privilege to the government context).
35. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985) (stating that the entity holds the privilege); Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383.
36. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349.
37. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 ("[lIt will frequently be employees beyond the control
group as defined by the court below-'officers and agents ... responsible for directing [the
company's] actions in response to legal advice'-who possess the information needed by the
corporation's lawyers." (quoting Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449
U.S. 383 (1981)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 386. Upjohn Company manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals in the United
States and abroad. Id.
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government.40 The recipients of the questionnaire and thirty-three other
officers or employees were interviewed by in-house and outside counsel. 41
The company then submitted a voluntary report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission disclosing certain questionable payments.42
Immediately following this disclosure, the Internal Revenue Service
launched an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the
"questionable payments" and issued a summons requesting "all files
relative to the investigation conducted under the supervision of Gerard
Thomas."43  The summons stated that the records should include all
"written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign
affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the
United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn
Company and its subsidiaries." 44
Prior to Upjohn, courts limited the scope of the attorney-client privilege
by applying the "control group" test.45 Only those employees who played a
substantial role in deciding and directing a corporation's legal response
were protected.46 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit
decision47 and expanded the privilege to all subordinate employees. The
Court stated that the control group test
overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed
advice.... [Thus,] "[i]n a corporation, it may be necessary to glean
information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-
management personnel as well as from top executives. ' 48
The Court also noted that often the attorney's advice will be more
significant to non-control group members than to those who officially
40. Id. at 386-87. The letter that accompanied the questionnaire noted that "recent
disclosures that several American companies made 'possibly illegal' payments to foreign
government officials and emphasized that the management needed full information
concerning any such payments made by Upjohn." Id. at 387.
41. Id. at 387.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 387-88.
44. Id. at 388 (quoting the summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to
26 U.S.C. § 7602).
45. See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (articulating the "control group test").
46. Id. (describing that the inquiry is whether the employee making the communication
is in a position to control corporate actions).
47. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan adopted the recommendation of a Magistrate who concluded that the summons
requesting production of all files should be enforced because there had been a waiver. Id. at
388. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court but ultimately agreed that the privilege did
not apply "[t]o the extent that the communications were made by officers and agents not
responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice ... for the simple
reason that the communications were not the 'client's."' Id.




utilize the advice, "and the control group test makes it more difficult to
convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect
the client corporation's policy." 49 Thus, after Upjohn, the attorney-client
privilege for a corporate entity extends to communications between officers
and corporate counsel, for purposes of obtaining legal advice for the entity.
The privilege also extends to communications from lower echelon
employees to counsel made for such purpose, concerning matters within the
scope of the employee's duties for the entity.50 It is important to note that
while Upjohn expands the attorney-client privilege to all employees within
the organization, it is the corporation that possesses the privilege, not the
individual employee. 51
In the entity context, the decision whether to invoke or waive the
privilege is controlled by the present management. When the management
of a corporation changes hands, former management's claims of privilege
on behalf of the corporation are without effect.52 In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Weintraub, the Court held that former management
cannot assert the privilege against successor management. 53 The Court
reasoned that because the privilege belongs to the entity, and the successor
group is the group currently working on behalf of the entity's interests, the
successor group has control of the privilege.54
49. Id. at 392.
50. Id. at 394-95; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343 (1985).
51. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348-49 ("The managers, of course, must exercise the
privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation and not of themselves as individuals."); see also 24 Charles Alan Wright &
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure Evidence 37-38 (1986) (defining
"client").
52. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349.
53. Id.
54. Id. The parties agreed that when control of a corporation is transferred to new
management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege is
also transferred. Id. at 349. The dispute in this case was over who has control of the
privilege of a bankrupt corporation. Id. The Court held that the bankruptcy trustee has
control because she "plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's
management." Id. at 353.
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C. Origins of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege
Like corporations, government agencies are entity "clients" 55 that seek
legal advice and can be parties to litigation. Following Upjohn,
commentary on the attorney-client privilege in the government context has
often asserted that the government client needs assurances of confidentiality
equivalent to a corporation's need for confidential advice. 56  Like a
corporation's in-house counsel, government lawyers are the legal experts
within their entities. To ensure sound legal advice, it is necessary that
government officials communicate freely and keep government lawyers
fully informed. 57 The government lawyers' responsibilities often include
evaluating the legal consequences of proposed courses of action and
performing the legal work necessary to implement the government entity's
policies.58 Government entities seek expert legal advice from their lawyers
in various situations including: determining the requirements of legislation,
assessing the legality of proposed actions, and evaluating possible avenues
of enforcement. 59 Because these duties are essential to the functioning of
most government entities, lawyers are integral to an entitty's ability to
accomplish its goals successfully. 60
A government lawyer's practice differs from a private attorney's practice
with respect to the duty of confidentiality because much of the information
government lawyers are working with is governed by pervasive
regulations. 61 Government lawyers are subject to extensive regulation
55. See Ross v. Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2005) ("This court has twice
assumed without deciding that a government entity such as a municipal corporation can
invoke the attorney-client privilege."); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d
527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying the definition of client that includes governmental bodies
from Fed. R. Evid. 503 (Proposed 1973)); In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury
2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the client is the State of Illinois
represented through one of its agencies); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273-76 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1) advisory committee note (proposed 1973), which
included governmental bodies as clients); In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing commentary for Proposed Federal Rule Evidence
503(a)(1) for the proposition that "the definition of 'client' includes governmental bodies");
see also Melanie Leslie, Government Officials As Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the
Privileged?, 77 Ind. L.J. 469, 474 n.13 (2002). The Advisory Committee's note cites three
cases for its contention that the definition of client includes government bodies. See Fed. R.
Evid. 503(a)(1) advisory committee's note (proposed 1973) (citing People ex rel. Dep't of
Pub. Works v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App. 1964), Rowley v.
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942), Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18
F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
56. Note, The Applicability and Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1021 n.1 1 1 (1982) (urging the
extension of government attorney-client privilege to parallel corporate privilege).
57. Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 1170, 1178 (2002) [hereinafter Rethinking].
58. Id. at 1178-79.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1178.
61. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291, 294-95 (1991).
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because the information they handle can include "military secrets, sensitive
negotiations with foreign governments, grand jury minutes dealing with
investigation of federal crimes, and millions of records dealing with the
most private matters of individuals and corporations." 62 There are detailed
regulations limiting government lawyers' use of this information and
prohibiting its improper dissemination. 63
In addition to the large amount of government information that is a
matter of public record, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 64 enacted
in 1967, broadened the public's access to a wide range of government
documents. In effect, the government has essentially "consented to
disclosure," thus limiting the government lawyer's duty of confidentiality. 65
Although the purpose of the FOIA was "'to permit access to official
information long shielded unnecessarily from public view' and . . . 'to
create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from
possibly unwilling official hands,"' 66 Congress created nine exemptions to
the FOIA that allow the government to keep documents from the public. 67
62. Id. at 294-95. Tax records, medical records, and trade secrets are all included in the
last category. Id. at 295.
63. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C §§ 6103, 6104, 6108, 6110 (1988); 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552(a)
(1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988)).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003).
65. See Cramton, supra note 61, at 294 ("[T]he duty of confidentiality does not extend to
information that the government has made available.., to the public."); see also Model
Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.6(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation .... ).
66. Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] Lawyer May Be
Held Against You-The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 Urb.
Law. 283, 287 (2003) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)). "Mink was the first
(Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)] case heard by the Supreme Court." Id. at 287 n.36.
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2003). In relevant part, this section provides the following
exemptions to the FOIA:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under ... an Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy...,
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute... ;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files . .. the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source . . . , (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to
risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the
life or physical safety of an individual;
[Vol. 75
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Most of the law on the government attorney-client privilege has developed
from litigation concerning the fifth exemption of the FOIA. 68 Under this
exemption, "'inter-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency' are excused from mandatory disclosure to the public. '69 While
"[e]xemption five does not itself create a government attomey-client
privilege, ' 70 it creates an effective government privilege only when "'the
Government is dealing with its attorneys as would any private party seeking
advice to protect personal interests, and needs the same assurance of
confidentiality so it will not be deterred from full and frank
communications with its counselors ... ."'71 The need for full and frank
communications between government officials and the government lawyer
is the primary justification used to analogize the government privilege to
the corporate privilege. While courts and commentators have almost
universally agreed that the attorney-client privilege exists for government
entities generally,72 they have widely debated whether the government
attorney-client privilege in the criminal investigative context conforms to
the historical rationale for the attorney-client privilege. 73
(8) ... reports prepared by ... or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Id.
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Porter County
Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 380 F. Supp. 630, 637
(N.D. Ind. 1974).
69. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1994)).
70. Id. at 1269.
71. Id. (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
72. See Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-
Client Privilege?, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 695, 696 n.4 (1999) (citing In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at
1104); see also Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1457 (1st
Cir. 1992); Ferrell v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 177 F.R.D. 425, 432 (N.D. I11.
1998); FDIC v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14, 16 (E.D. Tenn. 1991); Coastal Corp. v.
Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520 (D. Del. 1980); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57
F.R.D. 133, 138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Unif. R. Evid. 502(a)(1) (1974); Fed. R. Evid.
503(a)(1) (Proposed 1973); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 124
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); Steven I. Friedland, Paul Bergman, & Andrew E.
Taslitz, Evidence Law and Practice 642 (2000) (stating Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1));
Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 6.5.6, at 289-91 (1986); Ronald I. Keller, Note,
The Applicability and Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1003 (1982).
73. See infra Part II for commentors' arguments regarding the government attorney-
client privilege in the criminal investigative context.
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D. Government Attorney-Client Privilege in the Civil Context
In his treatise on the attorney-client privilege, Paul Rice states that "the
attorney-client privilege should protect communications with [the
government attorney] by appropriate representatives of his government
client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance. '74 Unlike the
private attorney-client privilege, there was little use of the government
privilege prior to 1967 when Congress enacted the FOIA. 75 The federal
courts were faced with a surge of attorney-client privilege claims by
government agencies when exemption five, "permit[ting] the government to
assert certain evidentiary privileges," was implemented. 76  While the
government privilege lacks the force of historical support that exists for the
private attorney-client privilege, "most courts agree that there is a
government privilege. ' 77 Following Upjohn, many courts accepted a
government privilege without addressing the policy behind it. It was often
assumed with minimal discussion that a functional similarity existed
between public and private bureaucratic organizations. 78
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a municipality could assert
the attorney-client privilege for communications between the city's director
of police and several city attorneys in a civil proceeding. 79 The court held
that despite the "surprisingly little case law on the issue," the "[r]eview of
both our sister circuits' precedents and outside authority confirm that a
government entity can assert attorney-client privilege in the civil context. '80
The court cited the four circuits that had decided whether the privilege
could be asserted in the criminal investigative context and concluded that
the available case law "'generally assumes the existence of a governmental
attorney-client privilege in civil suits between government agencies and
private litigants."' 81 The court used as evidence the fact that parties seeking
to prevent application of the privilege in other areas, such as grand jury
74. Paul R. Rice, Attomey-Client Privilege in the United States § 3:12 (2d ed. 1999).
75. Salkin, supra note 66, at 287; see also supra Part I.C.
76. Leslie, supra note 55, at 541; see also supra notes 68-70 (discussing FOIA
exemption five).
77. Salkin, supra note 66, at 287.
78. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (finding that the government needs the same assurance of confidentiality when using
an attorney as any private party seeking advice to protect personal interests); SEC v. World-
Wide Coin Invs., Ltd, 92 F.R.D. 65, 67 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (citing Upjohn to extend the
privilege to communications between SEC staff and counsel); see also Green v. IRS, 556 F.
Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (stating that the privilege "unquestionably is applicable to the
relationship between Government attorneys and administrative personnel"), affd mem., 734
F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984).
79. Ross v. Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005).
80. Id. at 601.
81. Id. (quoting In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 291 (7th
Cir. 2002)); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging government entities' successful assertions of the privilege in civil cases




proceedings, have conceded its applicability in the civil context to
demonstrate that the government privilege is sufficiently entrenched in the
civil setting.82 The court also found secondary sources extending the
privilege to government entities persuasive. For example, the court stated
that because Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 50383 restates, rather than
modifies, the common-law attorney-client privilege, the Proposed Rule has
considerable utility as a guide to the federal common law. 84 Lastly, the
Sixth Circuit used the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in
Weintraub as its ultimate justification for recognizing the existence of the
government privilege in the civil context:
As the Supreme Court has observed regarding the corporate privilege,
"[b]oth for corporations and individuals, the attorney-client privilege
serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients ... ." We see no reason that the function is no
longer served simply because the corporation is a municipality, or, more
broadly, that the organization or agency is a government entity.85
Based on the Sixth Circuit's rationale in Ross v. Memphis, it may be argued
that the government privilege in the civil context is analogous to that of
other organization entities.
Despite the courts' recognition of a government entity's ability to assert
or waive the government attorney-client privilege in the civil context, a
different set of rules has been employed by the courts in determining the
applicability of the government privilege in criminal proceedings. 86 This
deviation from the principles that ordinarily dictate the entity privilege has
likely arisen from the existing tension between the government lawyer's
public role and the private relationship basis of traditional conceptions of
legal ethics. 87 Unlike the private sector where lawyers are expected to
serve as zealous advocates, promote their clients' interests, and seek the
best results possible, there is a widely shared perception among lawyers,
judges, and various public officials that government lawyers have greater
responsibilities to serve the public interest than lawyers in private
practice.88 This view was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Berger
82. Ross, 423 F.3d at 601.
83. See Friedland et al., supra note 72, at 642 (including government bodies as clients in
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(1) (including government bodies as clients)); see
also supra note 55.
84. Ross, 423 F.3d at 601 (citing Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's
Federal Evidence § 503.02 (1975)).
85. Id. at 602 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343,348 (1985)).
86. Salkin, supra note 66, at 284-85.
87. Rethinking, supra note 57, at 1170.
88. See In Re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th
Cir. 2002) (stating that government lawyers have responsibilities and obligations different
from those facing members of the private bar); see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272
(D.C. Cir 1998) (stating that "[w]hen an executive branch attorney is called before a federal
grand jury to give evidence about alleged crimes within the executive branch, reason and
experience, duty, and tradition dictate that the attorney shall provide that evidence"); Leslie,
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v. United States.89 While describing the role of government prosecutors,
the Court recognized that a United States prosecutor's client is not an
individual or a private entity, but a sovereignty: the local, state, or federal
government. 90 The Court stated that because the prosecutor must act as
both counsel for the government and a government official, she must serve
the government's aim of "seeking justice." 91 Today, there is a strong sense
among those in the legal profession and the public that all government
lawyers, not simply those involved in criminal litigation, owe special duties
to the public. 92 If government lawyers owe special duties to the public in
all contexts, it is curious that a different analysis for the government
privilege exists only in the context of a criminal investigative proceeding.
Before discussing whether the courts should recognize the government
attorney-client privilege in the criminal context, it is important to
understand why a grand jury proceeding affects courts' analyses regarding
the applicability of the government attorney-client privilege. The following
section describes the functions and features of the grand jury.
E. Function of the Grand Jury
To understand why courts treat the government attorney-client privilege
differently in the criminal investigative context, it is necessary to review the
purpose and unique attributes of a federal grand jury. The Fifth
Amendment requires that charges for all capital and infamous crimes be
brought by an indictment returned by a grand jury.93 The Amendment has
been interpreted to require that an indictment be used to charge federal
felonies, unless a defendant waives his or her right to be indicted by a grand
jury.
Many of the hallmarks of our modem grand jury system originated in
England. 94 The grand jury was recognized in the Magna Carta95 and
supra note 55, at 497-98; James R. Harvey, III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation:
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1569,
1594 (1996) (analyzing Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 which states
government attorneys may have the "authority to represent the public interest in
circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so"); Rethinking, supra
note 57, at 1176-78.
89. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
90. See id. at 88.
91. See generally Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers "Seek Justice" in Civil
Litigation?, 9 Widener J. Pub. L. 235 (2000).
92. Id. (arguing that government lawyers have a duty to seek justice in both civil and
criminal litigation).
93. U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."); see
Paul S. Diamond, Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure 1 (Anderson Pulishing Co. 4th
ed. 2001) (1990).
94. Diamond, supra note 93, at 2-4.
95. The Juror's Website,
http://ctmac.tripod.com/fgi.html#ORIGIN%2OAND%20HISTORY (last visited Aug. 26,




operated in strict secrecy because it was initially a tool of the Crown. 96
Secrecy was required "to encourage witnesses to come forward and to
prevent guilty parties from fleeing before they could be brought to
justice." 97 By the seventeenth century, the grand jury's role had slowly
evolved, and it became independent of the Crown. 98 British colonists
brought to America the concept of the independent grand jury, and it was
well established in the American colonies prior to the Revolution.9 9
Historically, grand juries have performed three distinct functions:
investigating possible criminal activity, bringing charges if they find there
is probable cause to believe such activity has occurred, and reporting on
criminal activity or other serious misconduct.' 00 In United States v. R.
Enterprises, Inc.,1o I the Supreme Court described the function of the grand
jury:
[Tihe grand Jury "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." The
function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might
possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has
satisfied itself that none has occurred .... 102
Grand juries are favored by prosecutors because when investigating
criminal activity a grand jury has "virtually unlimited access to persons and
things that interest them." 103 Moreover, the grand jury is not controlled by
a judge but is technically independent. 0 4
Grand juries use subpoenas to gather the evidence that they need to use in
deciding whether crimes have been committed. 10 5 They can subpoena
96. See Diamond, supra note 93, at 2-4 (describing the origins of the grand jury). The
first English grand jury consisted of twelve men selected from the knights or other freemen,
who were called to inquire into crimes alleged to have been committed in their local
community. Id.; see also George J. Edwards, The Grand Jury 1-44 (Richard H. Ward &
Austin Fowler eds., 1973) (1906).
97. Edwards, supra note 96, at 21 (noting that the principle of secrecy survived as a
feature of the modem federal grand jury and has aroused the strongest criticism).
98. Diamond, supra note 93, at 3. After two grand juries defied King Charles II by
refusing to return indictments, the grand jury was regarded as "a protector of the citizenry
against arbitrary prosecution." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting); see also The Juror's Website,
http://ctmac.tripod.com/fg.html#ORIGIN%2OAND%20HISTORY (last visited Aug. 26,
2006).
99. The Juror's Website,
http://ctmac.tripod.com/fg.html#ORIGIN%2OAND%20HISTORY (last visited Aug. 26,
2006).
100. Id. at 101-23.
101. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
102. Id. at 297 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
103. Diamond, supra note 93, at 1 (noting that privileges do not typically encumber a
grand jury investigation).
104. Id. at 7.
105. See The Juror's Website,




documents and physical evidence (including videotapes, guns, etc.) as well
as witnesses to testify. 10 6 If the grand jurors decide that the evidence
creates probable cause to believe that the persons named in an indictment
committed the crimes charged therein, the grand jurors vote to return the
indictment. 10 7 A witness that ignores a grand jury subpoena will be held in
contempt unless she can appropriately assert her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege, or an applicable
evidentiary privilege "as the basis for refusing to comply with a grand
Jury's directive to provide testimony."' 0 8 Another way a witness can avoid
a grand jury subpoena is to show that the grand jury is being used for an
improper purpose.' 0 9 For example, it is improper to use a grand jury solely
to gather evidence to be used at the trial of one who has already been
indicted. "10
It has become increasingly common for federal prosecutors to subpoena
attorneys who represent "grand jury targets, subjects or witnesses before a
grand jury."1i l Attorney subpoenas are often viewed as problematic for
several reasons. First, an attorney subpoena is potentially troublesome
because it may cause a client to doubt her attorney's loyalty, thereby
jeopardizing the attorney-client relationship. 112  Second, a conflict of
interest may be present, requiring the attorney to withdraw from the
representation. 1 3  Finally, the attorney subpoena is often viewed as "an
instrument of abuse" employed by prosecutors "to breach the attorney client
privilege and/or undermine an attorney's ability to represent her client."'"14
106. In the federal system, witnesses cannot be accompanied into the grand jury room by
her attorney. See American Bar Association, Frequently Asked Questions About the Grand
Jury System, http://www.abanet.org/media/faqjury.html (last visited July 28, 2006).
107. Susan W. Brenner & Gregory G. Lockhart, Federal Grand Jury: A Guide to Law
and Practice 30 (2006) ("Since it investigates to determine the existence of probable cause,
the grand jury is not required to demonstrate probable cause for its inquiries. 'Mere
suspicion' is enough. And a grand jury can base its investigation on 'tips, rumors, hearsay,
speculation or any other source of information."' (quoting In re Special February 1975
Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 1977))).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1458 (7th Cir. 1993). There are
some limitations on the grand jury. For example,
[ilf one from whom the grand jury seeks testimony or other evidence can show that
the only purpose of the investigation is to gain evidence for his trial on pending
charges, he can ask the district court to quash the grand jury's request on the
grounds that it constitutes an abuse of the grand jury.
Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 107, at 30-31.
111. Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 107, at 186.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. In United States v. Perry, the Ninth Circuit observed,
The government's apparently increasing use of grand jury subpoenas on a target's
counsel ... has been almost universally criticized by courts, commentators and the
defense bar because it is viewed as a tool of prosecutorial abuse and as an
unethical tactical device US Attorneys employ to go on a "fishing expedition" with
legal counsel without first pursuing alternative avenues to get the information.
857 F.2d 1346, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 75
PRIVILEGED OR NOT?
Due to a growing concern among the courts, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) adopted a policy governing the issuance of attorney subpoenas in
1985.115 The policy mandates that no subpoena be "issue[d] to an attorney
that seeks information about his representation of a client, including fees
paid by the client, unless it has been approved by the Assistant Attorney
General of the Department's Criminal Division."' "16
In Branzburg v. Hayes,117 the Supreme Court stated that the grand jury
"has a right to every man's evidence, except for those persons protected by
a constitutional, common-law or statutory privilege."'118 While most other
evidentiary rules generally do not apply in grand jury proceedings, the
attorney-client privilege is applicable and can provide the basis to quash a
grand jury subpoena. 1 9 Because the primary purpose of the grand jury is to
discover the truth, "evidentiary privileges are anomalous in that they shield
the truth from discovery. ' 120 Despite the DOJ's view that the attorney-
client privilege "operates in a manner likely to impede the truth-seeking
function of the grand jury"'12 1 the privilege applies to "verbal statements,
documents and tangible objects conveyed by both individual and corporate
clients to an attorney in confidence for the purpose of any legal advice."' 122
The applicability of the attorney-client privilege in grand .jury proceedings
is firmly rooted in the American legal system in order to encourage and
protect confidential communications between lawyer and client.
Conversely, due to the unique issues that are implicated by subpoenaing
115. Brenner & Lockhart, supra note 107, at 342.
116. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice (DOJ), The Department of Justice Manual § 9-
2.161(a)(D) (added July 18, 1985)). In deciding whether a grand jury subpoena should be
issued, the Assistant Attorney General must apply these principles:
(1) [Tihere must be reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been or is being
committed and that the information sought is reasonably needed for the successful
completion of the investigation or prosecution. The subpoena must not be used to
obtain peripheral or speculative information;
(2) In a civil case, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the information
sought is reasonably necessary to the successful completion of the litigation;
(3) All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative sources shall
have proved to be unsuccessful;
(4) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse
effects upon the attorney-client relationship. In particular, the need for the
information must outweigh the risk that the attorney will be disqualified from
representation of the client as a result of having to testify against the client;
(5) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material information
regarding a limited subject matter and shall cover a reasonably limited period of
time; and
(6) The information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of privilege.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Department of Justice Manual § 9-2.161(a)(E)(l)-(5) (1993); see
also Diamond, supra note 93, at 187-90 (discussing the DOJ's policy).
117. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
118. Id. at 688 (internal quotations omitted).
119. Fed. R. Evid. 501, 1101(d)(2); Diamond, supra note 93, at 175.
120. Diamond, supra note 93, at 180. "After the privilege against self-incrimination, the
attorney-client privilege likely shields evidence of greatest interest to prosecutors." Id.
121. Id. at 176.
122. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
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government counsel, the law remains unsettled on the question of whether a
government attorney can assert the attorney-client privilege in a criminal
grand jury proceeding.
II. DETERMINING WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN A GRAND JURY PROCEEDING
The circuit courts that have considered whether the government attorney-
client privilege applies in a criminal investigative proceeding have used a
judicial balancing test to make their determination. In the process, two
different views of the government attorney-client privilege have emerged
among courts and commentators. The "methodology employed by
courts... involves a 'weighing of the values" ' 123 test to establish whether
recognizing the government privilege will serve the public interest. 124
Because courts have identified two values that appear to be in open conflict
when a government entity claims an attorney-client privilege, 125 the court
chooses the value that is most important and selects the rule that seems
most likely to encourage that value.' 2 6 For example, granting an absolute
government privilege will "serve the value of promoting full and candid
communication between the client and the attorney," while dissolution of
the government privilege in the face of a grand jury "will promote open and
honest government and prevent wrongdoers from gaining assistance at
public expense."' 12 7 Part II of this Note identifies and discusses the
arguments for and against the recognition of the government attorney-client
privilege in a criminal investigative proceeding.
123. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1292. Ellinwood criticizes this approach because
[it] fails to consider the incentives created by different rules. But both the Grand
Jury and Lindsey opinions used this methodological approach-at least
implicitly .... At least implicitly, this approach identifies the more important
value and then assumes this analysis justifies the chosen rule. A superior
methodology would require a consideration of the impact that various rules will
have on the behavior of people facing similar situations in the future.
Id. at 1292-93.
124. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is in
the public interest for the grand jury to collect all the relevant evidence it can. However it is
also in the public interest for high state officials to receive and act upon the best possible
legal advice."); In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293
(7th Cir. 2002) ("While we recognize the need for full and frank communication between
government officials, we are more persuaded by the serious arguments against extending the
attorney-client privilege to protect communications between government lawyers and the
public officials they serve when criminal proceedings are at issue."); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1273-76 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the privilege would contribute to the public
good by encouraging candor and frank communications between officials and counsel but
ultimately deciding that the public interest is served by uncovering illegality among
officials); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting the importance of the privilege in encouraging the full and frank presentation of legal
advice but rejecting the application of the Upjohn principles due to the strong public interest
in honest government).





Part II.A describes the rationales of courts and commentators that assert
that the public interest is better served by not recognizing the government
privilege in the criminal investigative context. By analyzing both circuit
court opinions and scholarly interpretation of these opinions, this section
provides reasons why courts should place a higher value on the public
interest in encouraging open and honest government and disregard a
government privilege in a criminal investigative proceeding.
Part II.B discusses the rationales offered in support of a government
attorney-client privilege in the grand jury context. The primary
justifications for recognizing the privilege center on the belief that the
public interest is better served by promoting full and frank communications
between government officials and government attorneys. The Second
Circuit's opinion upholding the privilege is described, as are arguments set
forth by commentators in favor of this view. Part II.A. 1-3 discuss the
circuit cases where the courts chose encouraging open and honest
government as the more important value and therefore, did not recognize
the government privilege in the grand jury context. 128 Following the
description of the courts' rationales, Part II.A.4 details a scholarly
interpretation for why the Eighth, D.C., and Seventh Circuits weighed the
value of open and honest government more heavily than promoting full and
frank communications between government officials and counsel. Part
II.B. 1 describes the Second Circuit case that employed the same balancing
test as the other three circuits but instead the court recognized the
government privilege in the grand jury context. 129 The Second Circuit's
application of the balancing test was different because it decided that
promoting full and frank communications between government officials
and government counsel is the more important value. Finally, Part II.B.2
provides the arguments offered by commentators for why the Second
Circuit's decision reflects a different application of the judicial balancing
test than the other three circuits.
A. The Public Interest Is Better Served by Not Recognizing the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege in a Grand Jury Proceeding
In the corporate context, courts have acknowledged that the purpose of
the privilege is to promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice by encouraging full and frank
communications. 130 This rationale has been extended to the government
128. See infra Part H.A. 1 (describing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum); Part
II.A.2 (discussing In re Lindsey); Part II.A.3 (detailing In re A Witness Before the Special
Grand Jury 2000-2).
129. See infra Part II.C (describing In re Grand Jury Investigation v. Doe).
130. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(stating that the purpose of privilege is served equally whether a corporation or an individual
is asserting the privilege); see also supra Part I.C (discussing the expansion of the corporate
privilege in Upjohn Co. v. United States).
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attorney-client privilege in the civil context. 131 However, in a criminal
investigative proceeding, this justification has been challenged by both
courts and commentators. Part II.A focuses on the reasons why the
principles for the government privilege are distinguishable from the
principles that typically dictate the private attorney-client privilege. The
rationales for not recognizing the privilege center around the idea that the
public interest is better served by promoting open and honest government,
instead of encouraging full and frank communications between government
officials and their government attorneys. By examining the Eighth Circuit's
decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Part II.A. 1 describes
the view that a government attomey-client privilege should not exist at all
in the context of a federal criminal investigation because of the "strong
public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public
officials."'132 Part II.A.2 discusses In re Lindsey, where the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged the existence of the government attorney-client privilege,
but, like the Duces Tecum Court, stated that the privilege recedes in the face
of a grand jury subpoena.133 Through a description of the Seventh Circuit
case, In re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, Part II.A.3 discusses
the idea that because a government lawyer owes ultimate allegiance to the
public, the attorney-client privilege does not attach for the government
lawyer and his or her official client where there are criminal proceedings. 134
Based on scholarly interpretation of the rationales for not recognizing the
government attorney-client privilege, Part II.A.4 suggests possible reasons
why the courts chose promoting open and honest government as the more
important public interest.
1. Eighth Circuit: In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
In 1996, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr served a grand jury
subpoena on the White House requiring the production of all Whitewater
related documents created during meetings attended by an attorney from the
Office of Counsel to the President and the First Lady, Hillary Clinton. 135
The White House identified nine sets of notes but claimed that such
131. Ross v. Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the historical
justification for the attorney-client privilege applies to the government privilege in civil
proceedings); see also supra Part I.D (describing the government privilege in the civil
setting).
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997).
133. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
134. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
135. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 913. The task assigned to
Kenneth Starr was "to investigate and prosecute matters 'relating in any way to James B.
McDougal's, President William Jefferson Clinton's, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton's
relationships with Madison Guaranty [sic] Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater
Development Corporation, or Capital Management Services, Inc."' Id. (quoting In re




documents were privileged. 136 The Office of Independent Counsel (OIC)
filed a motion before the district court to compel production of two of the
nine sets of notes. 137 The White House dropped the executive privilege
claim, relying solely on the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine. 138 The district court found that the conversations at issue were
privileged because Mrs. Clinton and the White House Counsel had a
"genuine and reasonable belief' that the attorney-client privilege would
apply. 139 The OIC appealed the district court's order, and the Eighth
Circuit reversed and remanded.140
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the government attorney-client
privilege does exist by stating that "[p]roposed Federal Rule of Evidence
503141 would have defined 'client' to include 'a person, public officer, or
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or
private." ' 142 The court went on to state that "[t]he commentary makes it
clear that '[t]he definition of "client" includes governmental bodies."' 143
However, the majority then pronounced that Proposed Rule 503 only stands
for "the broad proposition that a governmental body may be a client for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege" and that it does not address the
particular situation of this case, that is a federal government entity being
subpoenaed by a federal grand jury. 144 The majority stated that because the
privilege has not been applied in this context, the question is whether the
privilege should be expanded to cover this situation. 145
136. Id. at 913-14.
137. Id. at 914. The first set of documents comprised notes taken by Associate Counsel
to the President Miriam Nemetz at a meeting attended by Mrs. Clinton, Special Counsel to
the President Jane Sherburne, and Mrs. Clinton's personal attorney David Kendall. Id. The
second set of documents was notes taken by Special Counsel during meetings attended by
Mrs. Clinton, her personal attorney, and at times, John Quinn, Counsel to the President. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The focus of the Eighth Circuit's opinion was not on whether Mrs. Clinton
reasonably believed that her conversations with White House lawyers were privileged. The
court concluded that this issue was irrelevant to the inquiry at hand. Id. at 923.
140. Id. at 925-26 (case remanded for the entry of an order granting the OIC's motion to
compel).
141. Id. at 915 (stating that Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 is a "'useful starting
place' for an examination of the federal common law of attorney-client privilege" (quoting
In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994)).
142. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1) (Proposed 1973)).
143. Id. at 915-16 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1) (Proposed 1973)).
144. Id. at 916. The majority criticized Judge Richard Kopf's dissenting opinion because
he relied "too heavily" on the precise wording of Proposed Rule 503. Id. at 916 n.3. But cf
Katherine L. Kendall, Note, In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum: Destruction of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Governmental Realm?, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 421, 431-32
(arguing that the privilege need not be extended to federal criminal investigations because
the government already has the right to assert the privilege without exception as Proposed
Rule 503 is the embodiment of the attorney-client privilege at common law).
145. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915-16.
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The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that the entity privilege
established in Upjohn should govern the White House privilege. 146 The
court stated,
The difference between the public interest and the private interest is
perhaps, by itself, reason enough to find Upjohn unpersuasive in this
case .... We believe the strong public interest in honest government and
in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by
recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in
criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials. 147
The majority believed that its decision would not affect the ability of a
government lawyer advising an official who is contemplating a future
course of conduct; so long as "the attorney explains the law accurately and
the official follows that advice, no harm can come from later disclosure of
the advice, which would be unlikely anyway." 148 After weighing the
interests at stake the court determined that the attorney-client privilege
should not be recognized in the grand jury context because a "general duty
of public service calls upon government employees and agencies to favor
disclosure over concealment."' 149 This Eighth Circuit opinion establishes
the different public interests at issue in cases involving public officials,
holding inapplicable Upjohn's "full and frank" disclosure rationale' 50 for
allowing attorney-client privilege in cases involving alleged wrongdoing by
public officials.' 51
2. D.C. Circuit: In re Lindsey
The D.C. Circuit's version of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
came in 1998 when Starr began his investigation into President Clinton's
involvement in Whitewater and expanded the investigation to include the
Monica Lewinsky scandal. 152  Bruce Lindsey, Deputy White House
146. Id. at 920 ("[W]e believe that important differences between the government and
nongovernmental organizations such as business corporations weigh against the application
of the principles of Upjohn in this case."); see also supra Part I.B (discussing Upjohn).
147. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-21.
148. Id. at 921.
149. Id. at 920. To emphasize the importance of the public interest in questions of
disclosure versus the privilege, the court quoted a Supreme Court case involving a private
accountant:
"By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility with the client ....
To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the
client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the
accountant's roles as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations."
Id. at 920-21 (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)).
150. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (describing Upjohn's rationale for the
entity privilege).
151. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-21.
152. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Previously, the main focus of
Starr's inquiry had been on financial transactions involving President Clinton when he was
Governor of Arkansas, known as the Whitewater inquiry. Id. In 1998, Starr was authorized
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Counsel and Assistant to the President, was subpoenaed to testify before the
grand jury. 153  Lindsey asserted the attorney-client privilege, and the
Independent Counsel sought a court order requiring him to disclose the
requested information.' 54 The District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the OIC's motion to compel the testimony of Bruce Lindsey, and
the Office of the President appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 155
While the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the government attorney-client
privilege is recognized in some contexts, the court immediately limited the
privilege's scope by stating that the privilege "is not recognized in the same
way as the personal attorney-client privilege."1 56 The court then followed
with a discussion of numerous policy considerations, heavily relying on the
basic duties of government attorneys and officials when defining the
boundaries of the government privilege in the context of a criminal
investigation:
When an executive branch attorney is called before a federal grand jury to
give evidence about alleged crimes within the executive branch, reason
and experience, duty, and tradition dictate that the attorney shall provide
that evidence .... [I]f there is wrongdoing in government, it must be
exposed .... [The government attorney's] duty to the people, the law,
and his own conscience requires disclosure. 157
While the court did not identify the public as the client of the government
lawyer, 158 the court stated that "the obligation of a government lawyer to
uphold the public trust reposed in him or her strongly militates against
allowing the client agency to invoke a privilege to prevent the lawyer from
providing evidence of the possible commission of criminal offenses within
the government." 159 Using the government prosecutor as an example, the
court emphasized that government lawyers' special professional
to investigate "'whether Monica Lewinsky or others subomed perjury, obstructed justice,
intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law' in connection with Paula Jones'
civil lawsuit against the President. Id. (quoting In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d
496, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
153. Id.
154. Id. Lindsey also claimed that the communication was protected by the executive
privilege. However after the district court concluded that the "President's executive
privilege claim failed in light of the Independent Counsel's showing of need and
unavailability," the issue was not challenged on appeal. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1272. The court noted that exemption five of FOIA protects materials which
would be protected under the attomey-client privilege if applied to private parties. Id. at
1268; see also supra notes 69-71 (describing exemption five).
157. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272-73.
158. Id. The Court stated,
[W]e do not suggest, however, that the public is the client as the client concept is
usually understood. It is to say that the lawyer's employment requires him to
observe in the performance of his professional responsibility the public interest
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responsibilities to the public have long governed the actions they can take
on behalf of their client:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 160
To further demonstrate the duties a government lawyer owes to the
public, the court pointed to the government lawyer's obligation in a civil
action to "seek justice" and "avoid unfair settlements or results."'161
Although the court recognized that "if the government attorney-client
privilege does not apply in certain contexts this may chill some
communications between government officials and government lawyers,"
the court ultimately stated that the public interest in uncovering illegality
among elected and appointed officials outweighs the potential chill. 162
White House Counsel pointed to Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
where the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege is not to be
applied differently in the civil and criminal contexts. 163 The D.C. Circuit
rejected the argument that Swidler compelled the court to find an absolute
privilege in the government criminal context merely because there is a
government attorney-client privilege in the civil setting. 164 Despite the
Supreme Court's finding that there is no case authority for the proposition
that the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases, the court
held that this is only controlling in the case of private parties. 165
The majority's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege is qualified
forced Lindsey to testify because the government attorney's proper
allegiance is to the public. 166 Like the Eighth Circuit in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, the D.C. Circuit distinguished the public interest
served in allowing the attorney-client privilege in private contexts, ruling
160. Id. at 1273 n.4 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
161. Id. (citing Model Code of Prof I Responsibility EC 7-14 (1980)).
162. Id. at 1276 (noting that despite the potential chill, government officials have the
benefit of "fully confidential communications with their attorneys unless the
communications reveal information relating to possible criminal wrongdoing"). The court's
rationale has been criticized because it assumes that government officials will always be able
to know what is criminal ex ante. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1320. Ellinwood
provides an example to illustrate the difficulty in foreseeing a criminal investigation:
[S]uppose the Commerce Secretary needs to make a decision on export licenses,
and he consults a government attorney in the process of deciding whether to issue
licenses to U.S. companies who want to launch their satellites using Chinese
rockets. After consulting with an attorney, he makes his decision and foresees no
criminal investigation. Nevertheless, a congressional investigation into Chinese
influence over administration decisions later commences and includes the export
license issue.
Id.
163. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
164. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1278.
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that the public interest in full disclosure outweighed the possible "chill" the
Upjohn court sought to prevent.
3. Seventh Circuit: In Re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury
The controversy surrounding the government attorney-client privilege
has not been limited to the federal government. In 2002, attorney Roger
Bickel, who was employed as legal counsel to the Secretary of State's
Office when Illinois Governor George Ryan was Secretary of State, was
subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury.167  The federal
government was investigating "Operation Safe Road" and alleged the
existence of a "licenses for bribes" scandal in the Secretary of State's
Office. 168 Because Bickel had advised Governor Ryan when Ryan was
Secretary of State, federal prosecutors sought to interview him. When Ryan
stated that he did not waive the attorney-client privilege of the Governor's
Office, the federal government obtained a letter from Ryan's successor as
Secretary of State, which "purported to waive the Office's attorney-client
privilege as to all of Bickel's official conversations with all personnel and
officials of the Secretary of State, regardless of their particular position or
office." 69
The Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that the client is the "State of
Illinois itself, represented through one of its agencies."' 170 However, the
court's opinion primarily focused on the government lawyer's "general duty
of public service." 171 In discussing the government lawyer's duty the court
stated,
With this responsibility comes also the responsibility to act in the public
interest. It follows that interpersonal relationships between an attorney
for the state and a government official acting in an official capacity must
be subordinated to the public interest in good and open government,
leaving the government lawyer duty-bound to report internal criminal
violations, not to shield them from public exposure. 172
The court never addressed whether the purported waiver was valid, but
instead relied on the public interest rationale in compelling the testimony:
"It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public assets to permit a public
official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the taxpayers
167. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 290-91 (7th
Cir. 2002). Roger Bickel served as Chief Legal Counsel during the first four years of the
former Secretary's administration and as a personal lawyer to Governor George Ryan, his
wife, and Ryan's campaign committee since 1989. Id.
168. Id. at 290 ("The alleged (and in some instances admitted) corruption extends to the
improper issuance of commercial drivers' licenses, specialty license plates, leases, and other
contracts; the improper use of campaign funds for the personal benefit of Secretary of State
employees; and obstruction of justice in connection with internal office investigations.").






themselves otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, official
misconduct, or abuse of power."' 173
Despite Ryan's federalism argument, 174 the court stated that notions of
federalism did not prevent them from agreeing with the In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum and In re Lindsey that there was "no privilege in
the criminal context between a federal government lawyer and a federal
public official as applied to the current case involving a state government
lawyer and a state public official."' 175 By extending the Eighth and D.C.
Circuit Courts' "public interest" rationale to cases involving state officials
and state lawyers, the Seventh Circuit in In re A Witness Before the Special
Grand Jury strengthened the current majority position that the rationale
supporting the privilege in other contexts is largely unimportant when
weighed against the duty of full disclosure to the public.
These three cases when taken together suggest that the protections of the
attorney-client privilege necessary to promoting the public interest as
defined by Upjohn, and consistently applied in other contexts, are not as
important as the government attorney's duty to the public. In fact, although
these decisions acknowledge the rationale behind the government attorney-
client privilege in many situations, they ignore these considerations with
respect to government attorneys in criminal cases, creating a separate
justification for not allowing the privilege.
4. Arguments Supporting Open and Honest Government as the Stronger
Value
It is interesting to note that despite the historical justification for the
privilege, 176 the Eighth, D.C., and Seventh Circuits held that the public
interest is better served by not recognizing the government attorney-client
privilege in the grand jury setting. Based on scholarly interpretation of the
three opinions, this section suggests possible reasons why these circuits
chose promoting open and honest government as the more important public
interest. While the significance of having fully informed government
lawyers is rarely disputed, commentators have questioned whether the
attorney-client privilege actually encourages clients to have full and frank
communications with their lawyers. 177 Part II.A.4.a articulates the general
173. Id. at 293.
174. Ryan argued that even if federal attorneys lack an attorney-client privilege in
criminal proceedings, the privilege should be recognized for state-employed attorneys. Id. at
294-95 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 886 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1989) (implicitly
finding that the attorney for the Detroit City Council could assert the privilege)); see In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that
assertion by a state attorney "implicates potentially serious federalism concerns").
175. See Salkin, supra note 66, at 299 (summarizing the Seventh Circuit's response to the
federalism argument offered by Ryan); see also In re A Witness Before the Special Grand
Jury 2000-2, 288 F. 3d. at 294-95.
176. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
177. See Leslie, supra note 55, at 482-511; Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 Yale L.J. 1725, 1731-32, 1739 (1988).
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argument that client candor is less clear in the entity context. Using the
corporate entity framework, Part II.A.4.a also provides arguments to rebut
this criticism. Part II.A.4.b details specific arguments asserting that
although the corporate privilege is said to increase client candor, this
justification is inapplicable to the government structure due to the
differences between corporate and government entities. Finally, Part
II.A.4.c describes the argument that the existence of the crime-fraud
exception makes the privilege less likely to have an impact on candor in the
government setting.
a. Client Candor in the Entity Context
Because individual employees of an entity are not the "client" of the
attorney and do not personally hold the privilege with regard to their
communications to the attorney, some commentators argue that the
incentives for client candor in all entity contexts are less clear than in the
individual setting.' 78 One commentator argues that it seems unlikely that
the attomey-client privilege provides any incentive for entity employees to
divulge information to the attorney. 179 One possible response to that
criticism in the corporate arena is that the corporate privilege promotes
"institutional" communication with counsel. 180  The theory is that
assurances of confidentiality provide incentives for the entity client to
investigate within its own ranks. 181 The Supreme Court has endorsed this
rationale for the corporate privilege noting that the attorney-client privilege
for corporations "'encourages observance of the law and aides in the
administrations of justice' by promoting full and frank communications
between attorneys and corporate clients."' 82  In addition, corporate
executives often believe that their interests are sufficiently aligned with the
entity's to avoid a corporate decision to waive the privilege over the
executive's objections. 183  Because disclosure of the confidential
information would likely hurt the corporation as well as the individual
178. Leslie, supra note 55, at 489; Barsdate, supra note 177, at 1739 ("As in the corporate
setting, but to an even greater degree, it is unclear how the attorney-client privilege for
governmental entities can promote candor from individuals who are unable to prevent the
ultimate waiver of the privilege.").
179. See Leslie, supra note 55.
180. See Barsdate, supra note 177, at 1732.
181. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 Mich.
L. Rev. 665, 670 n.15 (1983) (arguing that Upjohn management would not have initiated an
internal investigation had they believed the government would be able to discover the
information collected). But see Robert G. Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescription for the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30
Buff. L. Rev. 11, 44-47 (1981) (arguing Upjohn's internal investigation was motivated by
potential legal liabilities).
182. Barsdate, supra note 177, at 1733 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
183. Leslie, supra note 55, at 507.
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executive, the executive is likely to assume that the corporation will assert
the privilege. 184
Professor Melanie Leslie rejects the idea that the justifications for the
corporate privilege are applicable in the government context. 185 Due to the
unique character of the government structure, Professor Leslie argues, the
government privilege is unlikely to encourage client candor, and thus there
are no sound justifications for recognizing the government attorney-client
privilege. 186
b. Justifications for the Corporate Privilege Are Inapplicable to the
Government Context
In her article, Why Privilege the Privileged?, Professor Leslie
vehemently rejects that the superimposition of the corporate privilege onto
the government structure is justified simply because the government, like a
corporation, can only act through its agents. 187 Her overarching argument
is that in the government context, the attorney-client privilege does not
promote client candor. 188 She argues that in the pre-conduct stage, unlike
their corporate counterparts, government employees have more motivation
to speak freely with counsel because they do not have the ever present push
to maximize profits that can sometimes conflict with the incentive to follow
the law. 189 In the corporate context, Professor Leslie points out that it is not
always clear in advance whether a court or government regulator will later
determine that corporate acts fall within the law's parameters. She argues
that because
[a] corporation could legitimately seek to push the law to its limits to
maximize profits, [c]orporate actors in this position might, in fact, be
somewhat hesitant to speak to counsel absent assurances that their
communications will not later be used against them should the
government or some other party later claim that the corporation crossed
the line. 190
184. Id.
185. Id. at 495-96. But see Paulsen, supra note 34, at 474 (arguing that "the United States
government possesses, as a matter of common law, the same attorney-client privilege that
exists for a corporation or other organizational entity").
186. See generally Leslie, supra note 55.
187. Leslie, supra note 55, at 494-96. But cf Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in
the United States § 4:28 at 137 (2d ed. 1999) ("The U.S. government is the largest employer
in the world. Its agency structures and problems are as complex as those of any private
enterprise. To the extent that the protection of the privilege is justified in any corporate
context, the need within the government is equal, if not greater.").
188. See Leslie supra note 55, at 494-96; see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying
Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev.
157, 164 (1993) (describing a New York City survey that found that the privilege is not the
primary reason that corporate clients consult their lawyers).




Professor Leslie asserts that it is reasonable to assume that compliance
with the law is a paramount concern of government employees, and thus
they "need no additional incentive to disclose fully to government
counsel." 191 Recognizing the government attorney-client privilege in the
grand jury context is not necessary to encourage full and frank
communications between government officials and counsel because
government actors want "to comply with, not stretch or exceed, the law's
boundaries."' 192 Therefore, officials "will be forthcoming with counsel
because they need not fear that later revelation of attorney-client
communications will compromise or embarrass them." 193
To prove that the government attorney-client privilege does not serve the
public interest by promoting client candor, Professor Leslie further
distinguishes the corporate privilege. She argues that although the entity
controls the privilege in both the government and corporate contexts, the
fact that the privilege is not personal to the individual has more bite in the
government context, than in the corporate arena. 194 Although a corporate
employee may rely on the corporation's assertion of the privilege because
she is confident that her individual interests are tied to the corporation's
interests, Leslie argues that government employees are unlikely to rely on
an entity privilege when communicating with government counsel because
a particular employee's conduct will not expose the government to entity
liability. 195 This argument reflects the rationale offered by the Eighth
Circuit when distinguishing the government privilege from the corporate
privilege in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum. 196 The court noted
that unlike a corporation, neither the government nor individual agency is
subject to criminal liability. 197 For example, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, the court stated that while corporate attorneys have a
compelling interest in uncovering misconduct by employees, "the White
House simply has no such interest with respect to the actions of Mrs.
Clinton." 198
191. Id. at 499.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 506-07; see also supra notes 28-32 (describing that in the entity context the
entity, not the individual employee, controls the privilege).
195. Id. at 507-08. Professor Leslie argues that the government is more likely to waive
the privilege over the employee's objection because unlike the corporate employee who
knows that he has the power to damage the corporation and all those who work for it, the
government employee does not have much leverage: "At worst, the government may have
to pay a civil judgment, but payment will not threaten the government's health or the job
security of all its employees." Id. at 507.
196. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (describing the Eighth Circuit's
rationale for not applying the corporate privilege in the government context).




c. Crime-Fraud Exception Makes Client Candor Less Likely
Professor Leslie argues that the crime fraud exception' 99 makes the
privilege less likely to have an impact on candor in the government setting
which further supports the circuit courts' decisions not to recognize the
government privilege in a grand jury setting. 200 Therefore, it seems logical
that the circuits weigh the interest in open and honest government more
heavily than promoting full and candid communications. She argues that
the privilege is likely to have even less impact on candor in the government
setting because 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) provides, "Any information... received
in a department or agency of the executive branch of the Government
relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and
employees shall be expediously reported to the Attorney General .... -201
Because lawyers are not exempt from the statute, 202 Professor Leslie argues
that "a recalcitrant employee is likely to know about it, and will be less
likely than her corporate counterpart to mistakenly believe that the
government attorney is acting in her best interest. ' 20 3 Leslie asserts that the
existence of the statute abrogates the government's attorney-client privilege
because it undermines the credibility of the privilege's primary
justification. 20 4 When possible criminal wrongdoing is involved, the statute
chills attorney-employee speech. 20 5  Furthermore, she argues that
Congress's enactment of the statute is evidence that Congress was not
convinced that the privilege encourages the candor necessary to obtain
effective legal advice. 206 In sum, Professor Leslie argues that "the reflexive
assumption that a government attorney-client privilege is necessary to
ensure that government actors communicate openly with government
counsel is a fiction." 20 7  Therefore, like the Eighth, D.C., and Seventh
Circuits, Professor Leslie asserts that the government attorney-client
privilege should not be recognized in the criminal investigative context
because the public interest is better served promoting open and honest
government and exposing criminal wrongdoing by elected and appointed
officials.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2000).
200. Leslie, supra note 55, at 506.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
202. See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920 (stating that
attorneys are bound by the statute).
203. Leslie, supra note 55, at 506.
204. Id. at 508.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 525. But cf Paulsen, supra note 34, at 497-500 (arguing that at most, the
statute constitutes a limited exception to the privilege and is analogous to a corporation's in-
house reporting requirement).
207. Leslie, supra note 55, at 549-50.
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B. The Public Interest Is Better Served by Recognizing the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege in a Grand Jury Proceeding
In the most recent decision addressing the assertion of the government
attorney-client privilege in the context of a grand jury proceeding, the
Second Circuit used the same analysis as the Eighth, D.C., and Seventh
Circuits but concluded that the assertion of the privilege was valid.208 The
court reasoned that the public interest is not as obvious as the prosecutors
contend, and "if anything, the traditional rationale for the privilege applies
with special force in the government context. '209 Commentators who
believe that it is more important to encourage full and frank
communications between government officials and government lawyers
than to uncover the illegal actions of elected and appointed officials support
the Second Circuit's applications of the balancing test.210 Part II.B.1
discusses the Second Circuit case and the court's justification for why the
public interest is better served by recognizing the government attorney-
client privilege in a grand jury proceeding. Part II.B.2 describes
commentator arguments for why the government privilege conforms to the
historical rationale for the attorney-client privilege.
1. Second Circuit: In re Grand Jury Investigation v. Doe
The Second Circuit recognized the government attorney-client privilege
in February of 2005 when Anne C. George, former Chief Legal Counsel to
the Office of the Governor of Connecticut, was subpoenaed to testify before
a grand jury investigating an allegation that former Connecticut Governor
Rowland accepted gifts in return for public favors. 211 In compelling
George to testify, the district court noted that it was "undisputed that the
grand jury need[ed] the information it [sought] to obtain from Ms.
George." 212  The Government contended that George's loyalty to the
Governor "must yield to her loyalty to the public, to whom she owes
ultimate allegiance when violations of the criminal law are at stake. '2 13
208. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005).
209. Id. ("It is crucial that government officials, who are expected to uphold and execute
the law and who may face criminal prosecution for failing to do so, be encouraged to seek
out and receive fully informed legal advice.").
210. Id. at 536. The court stated,
The Government assumes that "the public interest" in disclosure is readily
apparent, and that a public official's willingness to consult with counsel will be
only "marginally" affected by the abrogation of the privilege in the face of a grand
jury subpoena. Because we cannot accept either of these assumptions, we decline
to abandon the attorney-client privilege in a context in which its protections
arguably are needed most.
Id.
211. Id. at 529-30 (considering favorable negotiation and awarding of state contracts to be
public favors).
212. Id. at 530.
213. Id. at 533 (arguing that because the Office of the Governor serves the public,
George, as counsel to that office, must also serve the public).
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The court stated that it is implicit in the government's argument that the
"public interest in the present circumstances lies with disclosure and the
furtherance of the 'truth-seeking' function of the grand jury. '214 Although
the Second Circuit, like its sister circuits, focused its inquiry on the public
interest, it weighed the values differently than the other three courts:
We cannot accept the Government's unequivocal assumption as to where
the public interest lies. To be sure, it is in the public interest for the grand
jury to collect all the relevant evidence it can. However, it is also in the
public interest for high state officials to receive and act upon the best
possible legal advice.215
While the case was decided on the basis of federal law, the court noted
that Connecticut state law recognizes the government attorney-client
privilege in civil and criminal proceedings. 216  The court used the
Connecticut statute217 as a justification for weighing more heavily the
protection of confidential communications: "The people of Connecticut...
acting through their representatives, have concluded that the public interest
is advanced by upholding a governmental privilege even in the face of a
criminal investigation." 218 The court made clear that it was not suggesting
that the federal courts defer to state statutes in formulating federal common
law but instead used the state statute to illustrate the point that "[o]ne could
as easily conclude, with the Connecticut legislature, that the protections
afforded by the privilege ultimately promote the public interest, even when
they might impede the search for truth in a particular criminal
investigation." 219
2. Arguments Supporting Full and Frank Communications as the Stronger
Value
Despite the arguments set forth by Professor Leslie, other commentators
agree with the Second Circuit decision and argue that the government
attorney-client privilege should be recognized in a grand jury proceeding
because the justifications that exist for the privilege in other contexts are
applicable in the government setting. This section describes the arguments
that support the government privilege in the grand jury context. Unlike
214. Id. at 534. The court noted that "to allow the Governor's Office to interpose a
testimonial privilege 'as a shield against the production of information relevant to a federal
criminal investigation... 'would represent a gross misuse of public assets."' Id. (quoting
Brief of United States of America, Appellee at 23, In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d
527 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 04-2287)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146r(b) (2005). The statute states, "In any civil or
criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, all
confidential communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not
disclose any such communications unless authorized representative of the public agency
consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure." Id.




Professor Leslie, 220 Todd Ellinwood and Professor Michael Paulsen argue
that the privilege will, in fact, encourage client candor. 221 They argue that
open and honest communication between government officials and counsel
will enable a government attorney to provide sound legal advice, thereby
promoting the observance of the law and administration of justice.
Specifically, Part II.B.2.a provides the argument that despite the differences
that exist between corporate and government entities, 222 the justifications
for the corporate privilege can apply to the government setting. Part
II.B.2.b provides counterarguments to Professor Leslie's assertion that the
existence of the crime-fraud exception will reduce the likelihood of client
candor.
a. Justifications for the Corporate Privilege Are Applicable in the
Government Context
Although government officials do not face the pressure to maximize
profits that sometimes encourages their corporate counterparts to push the
law to its limits,223 Ellinwood claims that government officials still need
assurances that their communications will later be disclosed.224 He argues
that while government officials do not have to maximize profits, they desire
confidentiality in their communications with counsel because of the
potential political difficulties that might result if discussions about potential
courses of action are later revealed. 225 Even Professor Leslie recognizes
that a potential "political fallout from revelation of such discussions could
result even if highly placed agency employees ultimately chose a wholly
legitimate course of action. '226 This concern is even more pressing when a
government official seeks post-conduct legal advice. Without the promise
of confidentiality, fear of political fallout could "muzzle" the client.227
Like corporate actors, government actors might be tempted to push the law
to its limits for political gain.228 Therefore, in order to ensure that these
government actors are complying with the law, assurances of
220. See supra Part II.A.4
221. See Ellinwood, supra note 34; Paulsen, supra note 34.
222. See supra Part I.B (discussing the corporate privilege).
223. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
224. Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1320-25; see also Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of
the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1682, 1710 (1999) (arguing
that the privilege may be more important in the criminal investigative context because of the
possibility that an adverse verdict may lead to incarceration).
225. Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1320-25.
226. Leslie, supra note 55, at 511. While Leslie recognizes the possibility of political
fallout, she qualifies the statement by implying that this concern is only pressing for highly
placed government employees such as an agency head or the President. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 511-12 ("The chance that government actors might be tempted to skirt or
stretch the law for political gain is similarly present in government hierarchies.").
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confidentiality would encourage government actors to seek the legal advice
of government counsel. 229
Ellinwood rejects the argument that the justifications for the corporate
privilege are not applicable to the government privilege because
government actors will not rely on the privilege given that the government
has no entity liability.230 Professor Leslie argues that although a corporate
employee does not control the privilege, she may rely on the corporation's
assertion of the privilege because she is confident that her individual
interests are tied to the corporation's interests. 231 Although neither the
government nor the individual agency is subject to criminal liability,232
Ellinwood argues that this does not mean that justifications for the
corporate privilege are not applicable in the government setting. First, he
argues that the holding in Upjohn was not based upon the fact that a
corporation could be held criminally liable.233 Second, he states that it
seems odd to suggest that the government has no compelling interest in
"ferreting out any misconduct. '234 For example, in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, the court stated that while corporate attorneys have
a compelling interest in uncovering misconduct by employees, "[t]he White
House simply has no such interest with respect to the actions of Mrs.
Clinton." 235 This statement suggesting that a government entity does not
have an interest in uncovering misconduct of the First Lady seems to be in
"stark contrast with the value of open and honest government. '236
Professor Michael Paulsen supports Ellinwood's argument by asserting
that regardless of whether an entity is likely to be held criminally liable,
"entities" have legal interests in the actions of their employees and the
229. Paulsen, supra note 34, at 506.
230. Id. at 496-97; see also Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1330.
231. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
232. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997).
233. Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1330; see also Paulsen, supra note 34, at 496 ("It
requires an exceedingly narrow view of the potential legal interests of an organizational
client to assume that no such interests exist if the organization itself is unlikely to be indicted
or charged, and Upjohn does not take such a grudging attitude.").
234. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1330; see also Paulsen, supra note 34, at 496-97.
235. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
236. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1330. Ellinwood argues that without the privilege,
the value of open and honest government will be derogated because government attorneys'
efforts to ensure honest government will be restricted by fearful government employees who
are worried about possible mistakes but will not "'come forward without the protection of
the attorney-client privilege."' Id. (quoting Lisa E. Toporek, "Bad Politics Makes Bad Law":
A Comment on the Eighth Circuit's Approach to the Governmental Attorney-Client
Privilege, 86 Geo. L.J. 2421, 2428 (1998)). For example,
[s]uppose an official, who believes he did nothing wrong, suspects that people in
his agency might have done something illegal and would like to talk to a
government attorney about the situation... [T]his potential whistleblower will not
come forward if he is worried that there is a small chance he could be in violation
of the law. It is irrelevant if his concern is correct-if he thinks this possibility
exists, he will not consult a government lawyer because of the potential loss of
confidentiality.
Id. at 1330-31; see also Paulsen, supra note 34, at 496-97.
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privilege is necessary to ensure that the entity gathers the facts necessary to
obtain legal advice to protect those interests.237 He provides an example:
Suppose that employee malefactors have engaged in a course of
reprehensible conduct for which there is no reasonable likelihood that the
entity will be asked to bear legal responsibility in any way. Information
about the conduct might be relevant to legal advice about whether the
employee could be fired by the entity on this ground, without risking suit
from the chagrined employee. 238
Professor Paulsen argues that "the policies that animated the Upjohn
opinion" are not distinguishable in the government context, "at least not on
the ground that the United States lacks any legal 'interest' in its employees'
actions that would justify resort to the common law privilege." 239
b. Crime Fraud Exception Does Not Make Client Candor Less Likely
In response to Professor Leslie's assertion that the existence of the statute
abrogates the government's attorney-client privilege because it undermines
the credibility of the privilege's primary justification, 240 Ellinwood argues
that when possible criminal wrongdoing is involved, the statute may not
chill attorney-employee speech because it is unclear exactly how to read the
statute.241 He points out that some have argued that because the statute
refers to "violations" and not evidence of possible violations, the statute
only requires the attorney to notify the Attorney General in cases where the
attorney is aware of an action that is clearly wrong.242 When the Eighth
Circuit had pointed to the crime-fraud exception as a reason to restrict the
application of Upjohn in the government context, the court stated a duty
merely to report "criminal wrongdoing," which could be interpreted to
mean that unless the attorney had explicit knowledge of criminal
wrongdoing, a broader waiver of the privilege is improper. 243 While this
distinction is slight, the results could vary drastically.
Ellinwood describes another interpretation of § 535(b) that exists among
commentators which does not have any effect on the attorney-client
privilege.244 While the language of the statute seems to include lawyers,
the DOJ has reasoned that the statute must be read in conformity with the
attorney-client privilege.245 Then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel, Antonin Scalia, wrote a memorandum stating, "'Given
the absence of any discussion in the legislative history, it would in our view
237. See Paulsen, supra note 34, at 496-97.
238. Id. at 497.
239. Id.
240. Leslie, supra note 55, at 508.
241. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1326-27 (describing various interpretations of the
crime-fraud exception).
242. Id. at 1326.
243. See Paulsen supra note 34, at 498.
244. Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1326.
245. Id.
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be inappropriate to infer a congressional purpose to breach the universally
recognized and longstanding confidentiality of the attorney-client
privilege."' 246 Todd Ellinwood suggests,
Based on this statement, the statute should be read as being consistent
with the confidentially of the attorney-client privilege. This does not
mean, however, that the government attorney should assist a government
official who has clearly violated the law. Given the spirit of the statute
and the interest in denying government aid to those officials who clearly
violated the law ... [t]he proper interpretation of § 535(b) requires a
government lawyer, confronted with a clearly illegal action, to refuse to
provide assistance as counsel, but does not require that lawyer to report
the illegality.247
Ellinwood, however, states that if the action is "less than clearly illegal,"
the statute does not require that the government attorney violate
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege.248
Taken together, Ellinwood and Professor Paulsen argue that despite the
differences between corporations and government entities, the justifications
for the corporate attorney-client privilege do conform to the government
structure.249 Encouraging full and frank communications is the more
important value because even if officials do seek legal advice, it is likely
that they will be deterred from fully disclosing all necessary facts due to
their fear of revelation. 250 Therefore, by not recognizing the government
privilege, the value of open and honest government is not encouraged
because government officials will receive inaccurate advice based on
incomplete information.
III. GETTING TO THE ROOT OF THE PRIVILEGE
What happens next? If this issue arises in a circuit that has yet to address
the issue, how should the court apply the balancing test? Which interest
should it choose as the more important public interest? The following
section addresses these questions and suggests a resolution that would
eliminate the courts having to choose a rule251 that promotes one public
interest over the other. Part III.A critiques the weighing of values test
employed by the courts 252 and offers an alternative approach that would
better serve both interests that the circuit courts are striving to balance.
246. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General 2 (Nov. 30, 1976)).
247. Id. Ellinwood argues that if the statute is interpreted this way, it would create "the
perfect chilling effect" because "[t]hose who know they have violated the law will be
unwilling to go to government attorneys; those who are well-intentioned, but are simply
worried about the legal implications of a decision, will consult with a government attorney."
Id. at 1327.
248. Id. at 1326-27.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
252. Compare supra Part II.A.1-3, with Part II.B.1.
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Instead of allowing the courts to control the government privilege in the
criminal investigative context, this section argues that, like other contexts,
the entity should control the privilege. To demonstrate the "entity controls"
approach, Part III.B reanalyzes the Second Circuit case253 using the
alternative entity controls approach. Part III.C compares the judicial
balancing test to the entity controls approach, ultimately demonstrating that
by allowing the entity to assert or waive the privilege, the privilege's
intended purpose of promoting full and frank communications between
government officials and government attorneys is achievable without
degrading the public interest.
A. Entity Controls Approach
In the private context, "the question of who owns the privilege is easily
answered: the client. '254 In order to determine the proper scope of the
government attorney-client privilege, at least one commentator argues that
"it is critical to identify the 'client' or the owner of the privilege." 255
Although judicial opinions frequently endorse the view that government
lawyers owe additional duties to the public by virtue of their position as
public servants, 256 courts do not usually identify the public as the client of
the government attorney.257 For day-to-day purposes, a government lawyer
likely considers the employing agency as the client because officials of that
agency "hire the lawyer, provide instructions and supervision, and make
decisions concerning change or termination of employment. '258 Although
the client of the government attorney is not easily identifiable, a clear cut
answer to who controls the privilege is possible. Based on the "complex
web of institutional arrangements, regulations, statutes, and constitutional
commands" 259 that dictate administrative law, it is almost always clear who
has the authority to make litigation decisions. Under current law, adopted
in 1966, the DOJ retains all authority for agency litigation, "except as
otherwise authorized by law." 260 This exception allows nearly forty-one
agency and government corporations to maintain some authority over their
litigation.261 Litigating authority is divided up in many ways: "The options
range from agencies that have litigating authority before all courts on all
matters to agencies that have limitations on the subject matter on which, or
the court before which, the agency can practice." 262 Formal and informal
253. See supra Introduction, Part IB.1 (describing the Second Circuit's judicial
balancing approach).
254. See Ellinwood, supra note 34, at 1315.
255. Id.
256. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 153, 166 and accompanying text.
258. See Cramton supra note 61, at 301; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
259. Cramton, supra note 61, at 301.
260. Harvey, supra note 88, at 1573.
261. Id. at 1573-74.
262. Id. at 1573.
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agreements exist at both the federal and state level dividing the litigating
authority among various government entities. By aligning control of the
privilege with this litigation authority, the official with the power to assert
or waive the privilege within the government entity is easily identifiable.
Shifting control of the government privilege away from the courts and to
the government entity is not a novel idea and is essentially the approach
used to determine the government privilege in the civil context. 263
Currently, when the circuit courts are deciding whether to recognize the
government privilege in a criminal proceeding, their analyses do not focus
on identifying the owner of the privilege. Instead, the courts employ a test
that attempts to balance the public interest in promoting full and candid
communications between client and attorney versus promoting open and
honest government while preventing wrongdoers from gaining assistance at
public expense. 264 After the court chooses the value that is most important
to protect, it selects the rule that it finds most likely to encourage that
value. 265 For example, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that "the strong public interest in honest
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials" ' 266 as the more
important value and then chose the rule that it assumed logically followed
from that value. 267 It seems the courts are concerned that the public interest
at stake in a criminal investigative proceeding is greater than that in the
civil context.268 The courts are likely controlling the privilege in the grand
jury context because of the greater risk that the public interest will be
derogated.
Because there is a strong public interest in exposing criminal offenses by
elected and appointed officials, the courts' concern regarding the assertion
of the government privilege in the criminal context is reasonable. However,
shifting control away from the courts and towards the government entity
would not derogate the public interest. The "government lawyer's
'client' ... is not a private individual or entity, but a public entity with
public obligations that can be summed up in the overall obligation to
govern justly. ' 269 Therefore, when the appropriate government official is
deciding whether to assert or waive the privilege, he is obligated to consider
the relevant public interests.2 70 It is perplexing that the courts do not allow
263. See supra notes 78, 80-85 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part II.
265. Id.
266. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997).
267. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("In sum, it would be contrary to tradition, common understanding,
and our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege to attach to White House
Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.").
268. See supra Part I.D (discussing the government attorney-client privilege in the civil
context).
269. Green, supra note 91, at 266; see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
270. Green, supra note 91, at 266 (arguing that public entities have obligations to act
justly and promote the law).
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the government entities to control the privilege when it has been recognized
that
[t]he government, over-all and in each of its parts, is responsible to
the people in our democracy with its representative form of
government. Each part of the government has the obligation of
carrying out, in the public interest, its assigned responsibility in a
manner consistent with the Constitution, and the applicable laws
and regulations. 271
The Seventh Circuit also reflected this idea when stating that in
formulating privileges, the "court cannot ignore the interests and
responsibilities of the coordinate entitles within our federal system, all of
which are sworn to uphold the public interest and committed to the 'general
duty of public service."' 272 Based on this recognition, it would be logical
for the government entities to balance the relevant public interests within
the entity. The official controlling the privilege is in a better position to
assess the effects of invoking or waiving the privilege-that is, to determine
whether a waiver would actually chill communications between officials
and the government lawyer or whether it would be worthwhile to have the
information open to the public.
Although the entity controlling approach may become more complicated
in situations where there is an intra-branch conflict, the inquiry remains the
same. In the traditional case, the party seeking the privileged information is
usually different than the privilege holder such as the situation when a
federal prosecutor requests information from a state. In that instance, the
official with the authority for the state decides whether to disclose (thereby
waiving the information) or not. In intra-branch conflicts, the analysis is
more complex because the person seeking the privileged information and
the privilege holder are blurred within the same broad government entity.
For example, imagine an Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ engaging
in a privileged communication with the President; then imagine that another
Assistant Attorney General wants access to that communication for
purposes of a criminal investigation. Although this internal conflict adds a
layer of complexity, ultimately the question is the same: Who in the federal
government has the authority to decide?
B. Application of the Entity Controls Approach
Under either the judicial balancing test or the entity controls approach,
the end results of a particular case will likely be the same. For example,
applying the entity controls approach to In re Grand Jury Investigation
273
means that the decision to assert or waive the privilege would be in the
271. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273.
272. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 1997)); see
also supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the court's rationale).
273. See supra Part I.B. 1 (describing In re Grand Jury Investigation).
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hands of the Office of the Governor.274 Once the government attorney
Anne C. George was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, the
officials that have litigating authority within the governor's office would
employ a balancing test internally.275 The Governor's Office, as a public
entity, with public obligations, would have to determine whether the public
would benefit more by disclosure or by protecting the communication. 276
Because Governor Rowland resigned, control of the privilege was passed to
his successor, Governor M. Jodi Rell.277 Governor Rell would then decide
whether it is more important to disclose the information, perhaps exposing
Governor Rowland's illegal actions, or to protect the communication,
thereby encouraging officials within the office to have full and frank
communications with the government attorney. Because Rowland pleaded
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit honest services mail fraud and
tax fraud and resigned from his position as Governor, 278 under the entity
controls approach, it is likely that Governor Rell would not waive the
privilege. The public interest in exposing criminality was served without
waiving the privilege. Thus, the entity's internal balancing test would
clearly weigh in favor of promoting government officials to speak candidly
with government counsel. Under the entity controls approach, it is likely
that the Governor's office would assert the attorney-client privilege.
Although the Second Circuit reached the same result using the judicial
balancing test approach, 279 this will not always be the case. Governor
Rowland's guilty plea and his resignation were unique facts that aligned the
entity's internal balancing test with the court's balancing test. However, it
is easy to imagine situations that would have different results. For example,
in many situations, the government official with the authority to make
litigation decisions may weigh the public interest differently than the courts.
Indeed, this is certainly a possibility considering that the circuit courts
themselves valued the interests differently. 280
C. Judicial Balancing Test Versus Entity Controls Approach
The primary benefit of the entity controls approach is that it aligns the
government privilege with the privilege that exists for other entities.281
Furthermore, it creates uniformity in the application of the government
privilege in the civil and criminal contexts. While the D.C. Circuit was able
274. See supra Part III.A (describing who controls the privilege under the "entity
controls" approach).
275. In this case, it is likely that the Governor himself has the authority to make litigation
decisions.
276. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
280. Compare supra Parts II A.1-3, with Part II.B.1
281. See supra Part I.B.
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to distinguish Swidler & Berlin v. United States282 as only controlling in
situations dealing with private parties, there is other evidence in support of
a uniform application of the government privilege.283 In Upjohn, the
Supreme Court warned against uncertainty surrounding the privilege: "An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."'284
Unlike the circuit cases, the entity controls approach does not focus on the
type of proceeding in determining the appropriate test. Regardless of the
type of proceeding, the government entity should control the privilege, and
it should perform a balancing test internally to determine the ways in which
asserting the privilege would affect the public interest. Utilizing a different
analysis for the government privilege in the criminal context produces the
uncertain application of the attorney-client privilege that the Supreme Court
has warned against. 285
Although balancing the public interest will produce varying results,
government officials and attorneys will perceive the privilege as more
predictable because they will become accustomed to the types of privileged
communications their entity typically waives in order to serve the public
interest. This will also help solve the problem of whether the privilege
actually promotes client candor.286  With the entity controlling the
privilege, the government official will likely be able to communicate more
openly because he or she understands the interests that the entity has at
stake and will know whether the entity is likely to assert or waive the
privilege. The situation becomes more like that of the corporate privilege,
where the corporate executive often believes that his or her interests are
sufficiently aligned with the entity to preclude a corporate decision to waive
the privilege. 287 Perhaps the government official's interests are not aligned
with the entity, but she will know whether the information concerns a
subject that the government entity must waive in order to serve the public
interest.
The entity controls approach removes the balancing test from the courts
and places it within the entity. While the entity may be in a better position
to make value-laden policy judgments, it could be argued that there is a risk
that the government agency will overvalue its own interest at the expense of
the investigative interest. Furthermore, because the entity does not know all
of the information that the prosecutor knows, it can also be argued that the
government entity is ill-equipped to properly balance the interests at stake.
Although the entity may not be completely aware of all the relevant
information, the prosecutor cannot disclose this information to anyone.
282. 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is not to be applied
differently in a civil versus a criminal context).
283. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B.2.
287. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the courts are in no better a position than the government entity
to make an informed decision regarding the public interest. The problem of
accurately determining which way the public interest lies would not be
solved by allowing the prosecutors to control the assertion or waiver of the
government privilege. In that situation, there is then the risk that criminal
investigative interests will be overvalued. Because there are no risk-free
alternatives, it seems that the entity controls approach is the best resolution
because it is the only approach with the capability of promoting both public
interests at stake. With the judicial balancing test and the prosecutor
controls approach, there is an increased likelihood of chilled
communications between government officials and counsel. 288 While the
grand jury would be able to fulfill its truth-seeking function, the absence of
full and frank communications would hinder a lawyer's ability to provide
officials with the best possible legal advice to promote the observance of
law and the administration of justice. With the entity controls approach,
there is a risk that the entity will value its own interests more than the
investigative interests. However, it is unlikely that the officials with the
authority to assert the privilege would completely abandon their obligations
to the public and assert the privilege even when there is a strong public
interest in disclosure. 289  Open communication between officials and
counsel would also be encouraged because the officials, as part of the
entity, would likely know which interests the entity weighs more heavily
and be able to predict whether the entity will assert or waive the privilege.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to choose one interest over the other under the
entity controls approach.
The primary argument for restricting the government privilege in the
grand jury proceeding is that the dissolution of the privilege in the face of a
grand jury "will promote open and honest government and prevent
wrongdoers from gaining assistance at public expense." 290  However, it
seems that the crime-fraud exception should sufficiently achieve this
objective. It is curious that the courts have focused their analyses of the
privilege in the grand jury context on balancing the public interest of full
and frank communications with the need for open and honest government
when the crime-fraud exception was implemented for the specific purpose
of preventing wrongdoers from gaining at the expense of the public.291
Perhaps, this is evidence that courts have interpreted the exception like the
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Antonin
Scalia. 292 If the statute is interpreted to mean that government lawyers are
not required to report illegality to the Attorney General, but must only
288. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of open
and honest communication).
289. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (discussing the public obligations of
a government entity).
290. See Ellinwood supra note 34, at 1292; supra note 124 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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decline representation, courts may be compensating by changing the
analysis of the government privilege in a criminal investigative proceeding.
However, if the statute is interpreted to mean that government officials have
the duty to report any criminal wrongdoing, allowing the courts to perform
a balancing test to determine whether the assertion of the government
privilege would derogate the public interest in open and honest government
seems redundant.
CONCLUSION
In denying the government attorney-client privilege in a grand jury
proceeding, the Eighth, D.C., and Seventh Circuits thought they were
creating a rule that, while not promoting full and frank communication
between clients and counsel, supported the more significant value of open
and honest government. In recognizing the government privilege in a
criminal investigative proceeding, the Second Circuit thought the public
interest would be better served by encouraging open communication
between government officials, enabling the government attorney to provide
the best possible legal advice. The judicial balancing test forces courts to
choose between promoting one interest over the other. However, courts
have overlooked a solution that could promote both interests
simultaneously. By shifting control of the privilege to the government
entity, the public interest will not be derogated because the government
entity has an obligation to the public to govern justly. Therefore, the
government entity will be obligated to perform an internal balancing test to
consider the public interests at stake. While the government entity may
waive the privilege in some circumstances in order to better serve the public
interest, open communication between officials and counsel will not be
discouraged because the officials, as part of the entity, will likely know
which interests the entity weighs more heavily and be able to predict
whether the entity will assert or waive the privilege. There may be a risk
that the government entity will overvalue its own interest at the expense of
the investigative interest; however, the alternatives are not viable options.
By continuing to allow the courts to control the government privilege in
criminal investigative proceedings, the privilege has little consistency or
predictability. Unlike the government entity that is immersed in the
situation and is in a good position to assess the specific effects of invoking
or waiving the privilege in the particular circumstance, the courts are
making decisions based on generalizations. The entity controls approach
can promote honest government based on the government officials' position
of public trust and simultaneously promote open and candid
communication. This approach is consistent with the privilege law that
exists for the government privilege in the civil context and for other
organizational entities. It is illogical for the courts to begin creating new
tests for the availability of the privilege based on the setting in which it was
asserted.
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